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ABSTRACT. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocks (REDD+)
is a performance-based payment mechanism currently being debated in international and national environmental policy and
planning forums. As the mechanism is based on conditionality, payments must reflect land stewards’ level of compliance with
carbon-efficient management practices. However, lack of clarity in land governance and carbon rights could undermine REDD+
implementation. Strategies are needed to avoid perverse incentives resulting from the commoditization of forest carbon stocks
and, importantly, to identify and secure the rights of legitimate recipients of future REDD+ payments. We propose a landscape-
level approach to address potential conflicts related to carbon tenure and REDD+ benefit sharing. We explore various land-
tenure scenarios and their implications for carbon ownership in the context of a research site in northern Laos. Our case study
shows that a combination of relevant scientific tools, knowledge, and participatory approaches can help avoid the marginalization
of rural communities during the REDD+ process. The findings demonstrate that participatory land-use planning is an important
step in ensuring that local communities are engaged in negotiating REDD+ schemes and that such negotiations are transparent.
Local participation and agreements on land-use plans could provide a sound basis for developing efficient measurement, reporting,
and verification systems for REDD+.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past 5 years, Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation and enhancing forest
carbon stocks (REDD+) has evolved as an important
mechanism for introducing market-based initiatives as part of
global attempts to reduce carbon emissions. The idea is to
provide tropical forest countries with financial incentives from
compliance and/or voluntary markets to preserve and enhance
forest carbon stocks. In theory, this should be accompanied
by biodiversity conservation and socioeconomic development
in areas with low agricultural potential and limited market
access (Campbell 2009). The concept of paying local
stakeholders for avoiding deforestation and forest degradation
and enhancing carbon stocks has found support among a wide
range of actors (e.g., scientists, development practitioners,
policy makers, local communities). A framework based on
effectiveness, efficiency, and equity (known as the 3Es
criteria) has been designed to measure the outcomes of
REDD+ proposals in terms of achieving carbon sequestration
at minimum cost while contributing to sustainable
development (Angelsen et al. 2009). However, there are
growing concerns about the feasibility of implementing at
national and local levels a policy that forms part of an
international initiative to address the global issue of climate
change. Some scholars moderate the general enthusiasm by
recalling the lessons learned from past integrated conservation
and development projects, where win–win outcomes have
remained elusive (Blom et al. 2010, Hirsch et al. 2010). 
As REDD+ is based on conditionality, payments must reflect
land stewards’ level of compliance with carbon-efficient
management practices. The conditionality of carbon payments
is inherently related to issues of land and forest resources
governance at the national and local levels. Much of the recent
literature calls for governance improvements, while conceding
that corruption and power struggles are likely to undermine
payments for ecosystem services (PES) by fostering
unsustainable activities such as deforestation (Angelsen et al.
2009, Cotula and Mayers 2009, Streck 2009). The principle
of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) has also become
prominent, and local communities’ involvement in forest
governance is considered a requirement for any REDD+
initiative (Anderson 2011). In particular, efforts to increase
carbon sequestration will require changes in land/forest uses,
which could have serious implications for local communities
whose livelihoods depend on forest resources. Therefore, local
stakeholders should be involved in the design of REDD+
projects and, importantly, in the clarification of current and
future land uses (Agrawal et al. 2008, Kanowski et al. 2011).
As it is believed that community involvement in REDD+ has
the potential to improve equity in the distribution both of the
benefits derived from carbon sequestration and of co-benefits
(e.g., livelihood improvement, biodiversity enhancement),
decentralization of forest governance could contribute to more
equitable allocation of carbon rights (Charnley and Poe 2007,
Chazdon 2008, Agrawal and Angelsen 2009). That is,
enhanced local participation would prevent the capture of
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REDD+ benefits by elites from outside the community (United
Nations General Assembly 2007, Sikor et al. 2010, Anderson
2011). However, translating these principles into practice has
proved difficult. Of particular concern is the inadequate
involvement of local communities in tenure reform and
REDD+ planning (Brown et al. 2008, Cotula and Mayers 2009,
Streck 2009). Many observers have been disappointed by the
REDD+ readiness programs conducted by the World Bank’s
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) (Dooley et al.
2011). Similarly, critics have noted that the United Nations
REDD+ (UN-REDD) Programme has failed to respect its own
pledge of social commitments (Davis et al. 2009). Phelps et
al. (2010) have revealed a trend toward centralization of
resource control and a general neglect of indigenous rights.
Others have pointed out that the lack of meaningful
consultation and limited engagement with local communities
are undermining the FPIC principle (Dooley et al. 2011). 
The government of Laos has been involved in REDD
negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 2007, and the country
became a member of the FCPF in 2008. About 41.5% of the
total area of Laos is under forest cover (defined as at least 20%
crown cover, over a minimum area of 0.5 ha, with a minimum
mature tree height of 5 m), including forest outside protected
areas, which accounts for 13.9% (3.3 million ha of forest) of
the country’s land area (K. Ounekham, unpublished
manuscript). In Laos, where 79% of the population lives in
rural areas (the largest proportion in Southeast Asia), about
5.2 million people rely on forested areas for timber, food, fuel,
fiber, shelter, medicines, and cultural activities (Government
of Laos 2005). Forest was reportedly lost at a rate of 0.6% a
year (or 134,000 ha) between 1992 and 2002 (Government of
Laos 2005). Attracted by the potential of REDD+ to aid
poverty reduction, forest protection, and economic
development, the Department of Forestry under the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) has encouraged the
development of REDD+ pilot activities (MAF 2011). In 2012,
the newly created Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment took over the coordination of REDD+ field
activities from the former national REDD+ task force. 
In most such projects in Laos, participatory land-use planning
(PLUP) serves as a key instrument for involving local
communities in the design and implementation of REDD+
(MAF 2011). In identifying ways to reduce forest degradation
and creating associated incentives, PLUP may be applied in
relation not only to existing forests but also to fallows in
agricultural lands where forests can be regenerated, thus
making them potential carbon sinks. However, the Lao
government has largely disregarded customary practices of
land-use planning, which are advocated in the literature (e.g.,
Schlager and Ostrom 1992, Mendelsohn 1994, Wiebe and
Meinzen-Dick 1998), despite efforts targeting administrative
decentralization and redistribution of land-use planning and
management responsibilities among provincial and district
authorities (Lestrelin et al. 2012). Several studies have
reported that local communities have relatively little
participation in, and adherence to, land-use planning decisions
(Evrard 2004, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
2004, Lestrelin et al. 2011). Thus, the empowerment and
enhanced participation of local stakeholders represent
important challenges for the development of REDD+ activities
in Laos. 
In addition, the legislation on land and forest tenure is
undergoing revision because it appeared poorly suited to
performance-based PES mechanisms such as REDD+ (Moore
et al. 2012). Under Lao national law, the state is responsible
for the centralized and uniform management of the country’s
land and forests (Land Law 2003: Article 3). However,
individuals and organizations have full ownership of trees they
have planted (National Assembly 2007: Article 4), which, in
principle, constitutes a relatively solid basis for local
communities and other non-governmental actors to participate
in the carbon stock enhancement component of REDD+. In
reality, however, the question of carbon tenure is more
complex, especially in the context of avoided deforestation
and degradation on existing forestland. 
At the national level, the 2007 Forestry Law identifies three
main categories of state forests, as follows: 
l
 Protection forests, aimed at protecting watersheds, are
subdivided into total protection zones (where all land uses
are prohibited) and controlled-use zones (where limited
permanent agriculture, non-commercial logging, and
collection of forest products are allowed). 
l
 Conservation forests and National Protected Areas
(NPAs), aimed at preserving ecosystems and
biodiversity, are subdivided into total protection zones
(where all land uses are prohibited), controlled-use zones
(where limited permanent agriculture, non-commercial
logging, and collection of forest products are allowed),
corridor zones (where collection of forest products is
allowed), and buffer zones (where non-commercial
logging and collection of forest products are allowed). 
l
 Production forests, aimed at developing sustainable
forestry activities, are subdivided into forest management
areas (devoted to timber exploitation) and village-use
zones (where permanent agriculture, non-commercial
logging, and collection of forest products are allowed).
Even though production forests belong to the state, they
come under community management (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Tenure systems for the main land-use types
 
Tenure system Land-use type
Communal lands Rotational agriculture
Production forest
Sacred forest
Reserve land
Private lands Permanent agriculture
Plantations
Residential land
State lands Conservation forest
Protection forest
About 14 million ha, or nearly 60% of the country’s total
surface area, had been designated as state production,
conservation, or protection forest by 2011 (K. Ounekham,
unpublished manuscript). 
Outside of state forestland, a village land-use planning and
land allocation system is used to define residential land,
agricultural land, and the three categories of forests described
above. The District Land Management Authority can issue
land-use titles for land under permanent agriculture that falls
into the “private lands” category (e.g., paddy, tree plantations,
and annual crops, excluding swidden agriculture). Prime
Ministerial Decree No. 88 on the Implementation of the Land
Law (2003) also allows for collective titles to be issued for
village use of production forests and rotational agricultural
land (Government of Laos 2003). Nevertheless, village
protection and conservation forests remain the full property
of the state. If the village administration is made responsible
for enforcing state regulation in these areas, no individual or
collective titling is possible (Liu and Sigaty 2009). As a result,
the state and its forestry administration constitute the main
recipients of carbon rights on existing forestland. The process
of village land-use planning thus defines local people’s access
to natural resources because tenure rights and land
management rules are attached to each land-use type. Table 1
summarizes the tenure regimes associated with each main land
use in northern Laos. 
Given its history of centralized natural resource management
(Lestrelin et al. 2012), Laos offers an appropriate location for
exploring ways of involving local communities in REDD+
implementation described by Phelps et al. (2010). Drawing on
a case study in six villages within a swidden agriculture
landscape, this paper focuses on carbon tenure arrangements
and their implications for REDD+ benefit sharing. We build
on the insights from four complementary research approaches
(PLUP, political ecology, remote sensing, and land-use change
analysis) and describe the outcomes of including local
stakeholders in negotiating carbon management in terms of
equity and efficiency. Finally, the article discusses how action
research can inform national decision makers (e.g., in terms
of perceptions, expectations, and issues related to local
REDD+ implementation) and influence the national-level
tenure reforms that are necessary for large-scale
implementation of REDD+.
METHODS
Study Site
The case study site is in Viengkham District in Luang Prabang
Province, in northern Laos (Fig. 1), in a region characterized
by a predominance of swidden agriculture (also called shifting
cultivation or slash-and-burn) and low population density.
Most villages in the district have limited access to main roads
and markets, and households earn cash incomes from livestock
farming and the sale of non-timber forest products (NTFPs).
The six study villages form part of the village cluster of
Muongmuay, which has 462 households, and borders the
Nam-Et Phou Louey NPA, the second largest national park in
the country.
Fig. 1. Study area: village cluster of Muongmuay in
Viengkham District, Luang Prabang Province, Laos
Historically, swidden agriculture with long fallow periods
(over 10 years) was common in this area, and thus the densely
forested mountain chain of Phou Louey, located in the eastern
part of the case-study site, was under little threat of
deforestation. As shown by remote-sensing data, a gradual
segregation between agricultural land and forestland occurred
over time (Castella et al. 2011, Hett et al. 2012), with
agriculture concentrated along the only paved road and forest
preserved in less accessible or protected areas (Fig. 2a).
Successive land policies contributed to this segregation
process between the western and eastern parts of the landscape.
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In the 1990s, the government introduced a policy of resettling
villages closer to roads with the dual objective of improving
people’s access to state services (Evrard and Goudineau 2004)
while consolidating “state control over the land” (Vandergeest
2003:48), but village resettlements intensified the pressure on
agricultural land. Exacerbating the problem of the agricultural
land shortage was the implementation of the “three-plot
policy”, associated with the land-use planning and land
allocation program initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry in the early 1990s (Castella et al. 2011). The goal
was to eradicate swidden agriculture by restricting each
household to three plots for rotational crops, de facto limiting
the fallow period to a maximum of 3 years—and pushing the
system beyond its ecological limits (Lestrelin 2010). This land
policy also aimed at securing land tenure for local populations
by granting households land-use certificates. However, it did
not achieve the expected success in terms of improving local
livelihoods, largely because of the absence of alternatives to
traditional swidden agriculture (Ducourtieux et al. 2005,
Lestrelin and Giordano 2007).
Fig. 2. Land-cover/use map 2009 (a) and carbon stock
values 2009 (b) for the study area
Nam-Et Phou Louey NPA was established in 1993, and its
boundaries were expanded in 2008 (Fig. 1) when more villages
in the vicinity were relocated along the road. This resulted in
further segregation of the landscape with, on the one hand,
forest regeneration in strictly protected areas and, on the other,
degraded landscapes dominated by intensive agricultural
activities in the most accessible areas (Fig. 2a). Although forest
regeneration has obvious positive implications for
biodiversity in protected areas, the reduction of the complex
landscape mosaics, which retained a large share of the original
forest biodiversity, was detrimental to the poor upland
communities that relied on NTFPs as a safety net in periods
of food shortage (Castella et al., in press).
Methodological Framework
As Ostrom and Nagendra (2006) argue, obtaining reliable and
useful data on forest–people relationships is challenging and
requires a combination of approaches and perspectives. In this
article, we draw on insights from four complementary research
approaches based on different theoretical backgrounds and
disciplinary cultures. These approaches of land-use change
science, livelihood analysis, participatory simulations and
games, and political ecology are presented below: 
l
 Examination of the drivers of deforestation and forest
degradation through a historical perspective, i.e., analysis
of historical changes in land use and livelihoods (Castella
et al., in press). 
l
 Spatial assessment of carbon stocks by Hett et al. (2011)
following the detection of changes in land cover by
Kongay et al. (2010). 
l
 Application of participatory approaches to low carbon
emission land-use planning, where local stakeholders are
engaged in clarifying current land uses and negotiating
future landscape arrangements (Bourgoin et al. 2012). 
l
 Analysis of forest governance issues through an actor–
network perspective, that is, a political ecology approach
that describes successive land use and forest policies and
their drivers, implementation gaps, and impacts on
landscapes and livelihoods (Lestrelin et al. 2012). 
Encompassing these for research approaches, our proposed
methodological framework combines carbon measurements
at the landscape level with PLUP in the six study villages. A
land-use change model that simulates changes in carbon
management over time was used to account for carbon
sequestration. The following sections describe each step of the
overall approach (Fig. 3).
Carbon mapping
Kongay et al. (2010) produced land cover/use maps for
Viengkham District through visual interpretation of a
chronological series of Landsat satellite images combined
with ground truth surveys conducted in 2009. They identify
seven classes of land cover/use: upland crop, recent fallow,
shrub (which includes swidden agriculture systems), dense
forest, open forest, paddy rice, and other land cover. In another
approach, Hett et al. (2011) describe in detail how they derived
carbon values from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) (2007) biomass data and associated other land-
use/cover categories with those values. We combined the two
methodologies by simplifying Kongay et al.’s (2010) land-
use/cover classes using the terms in Hett et al. (2011) and
adopted the following four categories: agricultural land
(upland crop, paddy rice), young regrowth (recent fallow),
degraded forest (shrub and open forest), and natural forest
(dense forest). To carry out the carbon mapping of the study
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area, we applied the carbon values in tC/ha estimated by Hett
et al. (2011) to each of these four classes.
Fig. 3. Methodological framework combining carbon
mapping and participatory approaches to evaluate carbon
sequestration through different management strategies
Participatory land-use planning
We conducted action research in each of the six study villages
of the village cluster of Muongmuay in 2009–2010 to assess
the spatial distribution of current (2010) and planned (2020)
land uses in the study site. This project, whose aim was to
enhance communities’ participation in land-use planning,
involved a range of actors, from international and national
scientists to local authorities and village communities. During
the initial learning phase, local villagers involved in the village
land management committee designed a land-use plan for a
fictional village. This involved a role-playing game named
“PLUP Fiction” that was used in combination with
participatory 3D modeling to clarify the links between land-
use planning decisions and their consequences for livelihoods
(Bourgoin and Castella 2011, Bourgoin et al. 2012).
Participants manipulated simple figures corresponding to
socioeconomic and environmental returns per hectare from
each type of land use in their village. This participatory
approach to evaluating land-use scenarios facilitated the
comprehension of planning impacts on livelihood and
environmental indicators, and motivated further negotiations
among the villagers regarding land-use planning. The game
gave the participants the opportunity (1) to define a collective
land-use strategy for the virtual landscape displayed on the
game board and (2) to become aware of the relationships
among landscape composition, land rights, and access to
natural resources. The game was also used to introduce the
concepts of carbon payments and REDD+, and local
stakeholders could then modify their plans based on this new
parameter (namely, carbon payments). 
After this learning phase, the participants considered the land-
use zoning and planning of the actual village. By employing
a socioeconomic and environmental assessment tool based on
a participatory geographic information system (GIS),
members of the village land management committee along
with government representatives could explore alternative
landscape-change scenarios and assess their implications in
terms of resource management strategies (Bourgoin 2012).
The process is iterative; after the model outputs have been
communicated to the actors, they are free to modify the land-
use plans and negotiate new arrangements until they reach an
agreement on consensual management rules for the next 10
years that will then be endorsed by the district administration.
For both current zoning and future land-use planning, local
stakeholders clarified the tenure system by identifying
communal, private, and state lands (Table 1).
Land-use change model
Land-use plans incorporate local demand for agricultural
innovations and/or changes in land uses that will be supported
by government extension services and/or development
projects (Bourgoin et al. 2012). To determine the value of
negotiated management (through PLUP) in terms of carbon
sequestration, we built a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario
using a land-use change model that corresponds to current
management practices (Fig. 4). As the participatory land-use
plan is a 10-year projection of the negotiated future land use,
we then applied a land-use change model based on a
deterministic transition matrix to estimate land-cover changes
after 10 years of the BAU land management practices. The
results (Table 2) are based on expert knowledge, and the
numbers in the matrix reflect changes in land-use/cover classes
over the 10-year forecast period. We then compared the
patterns of carbon sequestration generated under each land-
use plan (Fig. 4).
RESULTS
By applying the methodology described above, we were able
to capture the spatial distribution of carbon stocks and forecast
changes at the landscape level. In this way, we elicited useful
information about the expected volume of carbon credits that
could be generated under each tenure system. In the present
research, we visualized the distribution of carbon stocks in the
landscape in a GIS by computing the carbon values for each
land cover/use category. Figure 2 presents a land cover/use
map and carbon stock densities for the study area, with the
total estimated value of 2,146,113 tons of carbon (tC) for the
study window. As seen, when the existing administrative
geometry is superimposed on the carbon density layer, the
NPA (in the eastern part of the landscape) harbors 70% of the
total amount of carbon in the study window, even though it
covers only 30% of the area. However, at the national level,
a greater proportion of the carbon stock in Laos is outside
NPAs: NPAs have higher carbon density but cover a relatively
small area of the national territory (Hett et al. 2011). This
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Table 2. Transition matrix for the land-cover/use change model (the numbers correspond to land-cover/use classes displayed
in the first column)
 
Evolution of land cover under management (10 years)
Land cover/use (classes) Forest
conservation
Forest
protection
Forest
production
Annual
crops
Plantations Reserve
land
Built-up and
permanent areas
Swidden agriculture (1) 2 2 2 1 2 2 5
Shrub / tree fallow (2) 3 3 2 1 2 2 5
Open forest (3) 4 4 3 1 2 3 5
Dense forest (4) 4 4 3 1 2 3 5
Built-up areas (5) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
observation lends support to the proposal to include more
agriculture/forest mosaics because of their potential for carbon
sequestration. Moreover, as most villages are located outside
the NPAs, poor, forest-dependent communities may not
benefit from carbon payments. To assess how including local
stakeholders in negotiations of carbon management would
affect the efficiency of REDD+ (i.e., carbon sequestration),
we focused on the complex agriculture/forest mosaics where
most forest degradation occurs (Castella et al. in press, Moore
et al. 2012).
Fig. 4. Participatory land-use plan and cumulated carbon
sequestration for each land-use polygon over a 10-year
period for the village cluster of Muongmuay
The land-use plan negotiated by the villagers and endorsed by
the local government was overlaid on the carbon map
estimated from the current land cover. Within the village-
cluster boundaries, the estimated carbon stock is 240,076 tons
(Fig. 2b). We chose this village-cluster carbon stock as the
reference level to evaluate the amount of carbon sequestered
over 10 years, based on the plans made during PLUP. The
transition matrix (Table 2) was used to estimate the future land
cover based on the management strategy established through
PLUP. A comparison of the distribution of the current and
projected land-use/cover stages reveals an increase of 44% in
carbon storage after 10 years of implementation of the land-
use plan negotiated through PLUP. Furthermore, a comparison
of the amounts of carbon stored with the PLUP land-use plan
and the BAU projected reference level reveals that an
additional 20,870 tons is stored under the PLUP-derived plan
(Table 3). We attribute this difference to the decrease in
swidden areas and the increase in forested areas under the
PLUP-derived plan (Table 2). As presented in Table 1, land
zoning de facto associates land tenure rights with land-use
types. When overlaying the tenure rights on the PLUP map in
a GIS (Fig. 5a), we observe that, even within the village
territories, 90% of the carbon is found in state forests and the
remaining 10% is in communal or private forests.
Fig. 5. Representation of the tenure systems generated by
different management strategies for the village cluster of
Muongmuay
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Table 3. Carbon sequestration after 10 years under different management strategies (BAU, PLUP)
 
Tenure system Communal lands Private lands State lands Total
Carbon sequestration under BAU –4% (–3372.8 tC) 2% (1686.4 tC) 102% (86006.4 tC) 84,320 tC
Carbon sequestration under PLUP 3% (3155.7 tC) 7% (7363.3 tC) 91% (95722.9 tC) 105,190 tC
DISCUSSION
In the current legal and regulatory context in Laos, government
agencies mainly hold forest carbon rights, and so are expected
to be the main beneficiaries of REDD+ schemes. Non-
governmental organizations and private enterprises may also
become important recipients of REDD+ payments through
sustainable forestry initiatives and plantation concessions. The
situation is more ambiguous for local communities. Currently,
they can retain carbon rights over planted forestland and can
claim collective land rights over village production forests.
However, they are not eligible for land (and a fortiori carbon)
rights in the carbon-rich areas (i.e., state and village protection
and conservation forests) that will generate the greatest
benefits from REDD+ payments. Who will benefit from
carbon payments will depend on which REDD+
implementation strategies are adopted at the national level. 
Two main scenarios emerge as possibilities. Under a scenario
known as “state capture,” REDD+ projects would concentrate
on densely forested areas, i.e., the NPA in the eastern side of
our study landscape. This scenario considers the criticisms
that have been leveled at people-centered approaches for
leading to weak, decentralized governance and cumbersome
institutional reforms. According to the Wildlife Conservation
Society, law enforcement would be the most efficient
mechanism for avoiding deforestation and forest degradation
in the state forest because of the presence of infrastructure and
villages within and bordering the park (Moore et al. 2011).
State-piloted REDD+ projects would deliver carbon credits to
the NPA, and this additional revenue could be used to pay
rangers to patrol the forest and monitor park dwellers’
activities. 
Under an alternative scenario known as “state redistribution
to communities”, local communities would become partners
in natural resource management inside and around the park.
It has been noted that giving local people social control over
park boundaries and control of illegal activities (i.e., logging,
poaching, and forest encroachment by swiddeners) creates a
cost-effective system (Agrawal and Chhatre 2009). Sharing
carbon credits with villages inside and around the park is seen
as a form of compensation for the loss of access to forest
resources for local communities that traditionally depend on
forests for their livelihood (e.g., NTFP collection, hunting).
Borner et al. (2011) call for a combination of law enforcement
“sticks” and payment “carrots” as a way of increasing equity.
As carbon credits are essentially generated from state forest,
benefit-sharing arrangements would be at the discretion of the
forest landowner, i.e., the NPA authorities—which could
jeopardize the equity principle. 
As noted by Phelps et al. (2010), REDD+ may actually reverse
decentralization trends by strengthening the state in its new
role as carbon accountant. However, if efficiency and equity
are to be maximized, the role of local communities must go
beyond data collection for forest monitoring. To ensure fair
distribution of co-benefits and to provide the incentives
necessary to ensure local communities stay involved beyond
the planning phases, participatory approaches need to be
complemented by national tenure reforms (Larson 2011,
Palmer 2011). Importantly, the success of REDD+ depends
on titles being granted for existing forestland and/or the
establishment of forest management contracts. Village Land
and Forest Management Agreements established during PLUP
and certified by the district administration could serve as
binding contracts and prevent land grabs by external investors
motivated by the commoditization of the forests’ carbon
(Palmer-Fry 2011). Such agreements, however, have
important limits in terms of tenure security vis-à-vis land
concessions and state development projects. Ultimately, if
local communities are not granted strong forest tenure and
carbon rights, REDD+ could actually further marginalize local
stakeholders, who are already largely excluded from
management of carbon-rich areas because of village
resettlements and land-use regulations. 
In the experiment described in this paper, engaging villagers
in planning for REDD+ through PLUP created a strong sense
of ownership in the community in terms of both process and
outcome. In the successive iterations of the participatory
planning process, villagers agreed to increase the size of
production forests; in other words, they agreed to allow the
regeneration of certain fallow areas where they could continue
to collect NTFPs and wood for their own consumption. Thus,
the negotiated approach enabled more carbon storage than a
BAU model and secured, with relatively little investment, the
consent of local communities (Anderson 2011). Essentially,
PLUP represents a way of empowering local communities and
involving them in decision making (Lyster 2011). This pro-
poor approach could also facilitate community-based
monitoring and ease discussions around REDD+
implementation issues (Danielsen et al. 2011). Lessons from
this example of local implementation and on-the-ground
empirical knowledge could feed policy formulation processes
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and foster land-tenure reforms that would enable a more
effective and more equitable REDD+ mechanism (Karsenty
and Ongolo 2012, Palmer 2011). For instance, although the
participatory process seems crucial in terms of enhanced
legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of REDD+
implementation, it remains doubtful whether it will benefit
equity, the last parameter of the “3Es equation” (Angelsen et
al. 2009) in the absence of reforms for land carbon tenure.  
The focus for REDD+ mechanisms seems to be on maximizing
the effectiveness of carbon storage, but overlooking equity
could prove detrimental for the feasibility of REDD+ projects
by alienating local communities and increasing potential land
conflicts and deforestation (Angelsen et al. 2009). As noted
by Cotula and Mayers (2009), experiments in local tenure and
social justice must take precedence to engage with national
decision makers and highlight potential weaknesses in current
land and forestry laws if the country wishes to engage in
REDD+. The current legal system should be harmonized with
REDD+ principles. It should also go beyond the illusion that
markets and economic incentives alone will safeguard forest
health (Borner et al. 2010). Policy innovations at the national
level should acknowledge the need to share the costs and
benefits of REDD+ between the state and individuals (Palmer
2011). A co-management agreement established at the
national level could be translated into practice by the shared
management of forested lands within village boundaries
(Carlsson and Berkes 2005). Through this partnership, social
control could efficiently be mixed with current command-and-
control approaches (Borner et al. 2010). Balancing of powers
could prevent potential drifts toward unsustainable measures
by both sides. 
The tenure map in Fig. 5b shows that, under co-management,
carbon sequestration and the potential co-benefits attached to
it would create more balance between communal and state
land. Securing tenure rights of local populations over
communal lands could incentivize land management changes
toward less intensive swidden systems and carbon
sequestration in complex landscape mosaics. This would be
an important step toward the demystification of swidden
agriculture and rehabilitation of agroforestry systems in
political circles (van Noordwijk et al. 2008). As emphasized
by Hett et al. (2012:609), a REDD+ scheme could be used to
revert to long crop-fallow periods, “raising the carbon stocks
at the landscape level.” Swidden agriculture remains excluded
from current land registration processes, and therefore, from
REDD+ schemes. A clarification of tenure rules combined
with an innovative method of measurement, reporting, and
verification specific to swidden landscapes are necessary to
allow local stakeholders to benefit from carbon sequestration
in the complex agriculture/forest mosaics that they have been
managing for many generations (Fox et al. 2011, Hett et al.
2012). 
In a context of centralized forest governance, the approach
and tools described in this article could support enhanced
participation of local communities in decision making on land
use and forest carbon stock management. The rationale here
was to propose a landscape planning perspective that defines
management strategies and rules at the village level before
land is actually allocated for a certain use. The experiment in
Viengkham District exemplifies the methodological
improvements required to bridge PLUP and carbon
assessments from satellite imagery. At this stage of the
research, more emphasis was put on the level of community
engagement than on the accuracy of the land-use/carbon
models. In this respect, complex issues related to how REDD+
will actually function (e.g., leakage issues) have been
deliberately overlooked. In addition, the land-use change
model is simplified and constrained by the deterministic nature
of the transition matrix. Linear changes between land-use/
cover categories bypass land conversion decisions that may
occur in a BAU scenario over a 10-year period. More
sophisticated models combined with carbon monitoring in
reference areas may provide more realistic values for carbon
sequestration under BAU. This issue forms part of the
iREDD+ research project (http://i-redd.eu/). Nevertheless, the
method used here demonstrates the importance of secured
communal land-tenure rights if the REDD+ scheme is to
benefit local stakeholders in swidden landscapes.
CONCLUSION
Our research showed that participatory approaches combined
with spatial analysis of land use and carbon stocks at the
landscape level can make an important contribution toward
enhancing efficiency in carbon sequestration by empowering
local communities through relevant scientific knowledge and
tools to negotiate REDD+ arrangements. By facilitating local
understanding of socioenvironmental issues and allowing
stakeholders to reflect on their future, this innovative approach
may provide a valuable insight on the local implementation
of REDD+ mechanisms. It could also contribute to reshaping
power relationships, which have long undermined land-use
planning implementation in Laos. Importantly, the PLUP-
based approach to REDD+ allows for broader and better-
shared access to the knowledge that is required for negotiations
on carbon sequestration at the local level. 
We offer insight for those who take participation as an end in
itself. Although clear tenure rights and community
participation are critical to the success and sustainability of
REDD+, they represent only one step toward an effective and
equitable REDD+. Tenure reforms made at the national level
will ultimately be necessary for addressing local people’s
individual and collective rights. 
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